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1 Introduction
“A house may be large or small; as long as the neighboring houses are likewise small,
it satisfies all social requirement for a residence. But let there arise next to the little
house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut.”
– Karl Marx, Wage, Labor and Capital, 1847
In his analysis of economic growth and competition, Hirsch (1976) argued consumption
choices are ultimately positional. They are driven by how individuals rank in comparison to
others in multiple sectors of the economy. Frank (2013) furtherly emphasized that in societies
where income and wealth inequalities are constantly increasing, individual competition turns
into a positional arms race with no improvements for society as a whole. This article argues
positionality has been a key driver of housingmarket dynamics in American suburbs. Exploiting
homeowners’ experienced variations in the size of newly built houses after they moved in, it
shows that within-suburb changes in the relative size of a house affects its valuation, and
estimates the contribution of positional externalities to the mortgage debt expansion over the
period that preceded the Great Recession.
From 1940 onward, suburbs accounted for more population growth than central cities and,
by 2000, half of the entire U.S. population lived in the suburbs of metropolitan areas. The period
simultaneously saw an impressive upscaling in size of suburban single-family houses. From an
original dataset of more than 3 millions houses built between 1920 and 2009, I document that
the median newly built suburban house doubled in size since 1945, while the ten percent biggest
houses built experienced an upscaling of nearly 120%. Typically, the latter used to average 4000
square in the years preceding the Great Depression and fell to 3000 square feet in 1945. They
did not recover their 1930s level until the 1980s, with “superstar houses" reaching 7000 square
feet on average at the eve of the 2008 financial crisis. Since the number of people per household
decreased from 3.3 in 1960 to an average of 2.6 in 2007, the amount of private space per person
considered to be socially desirable has been increasing at an even higher rate. Meanwhile, the
mortgage debt to income ratio in the US went from 20% of total household income in 1945 to
90% in 2008, following a trend that closely matched the historical variation in housing size.
The Easterlin paradox posits that increasing the income of all does not increase the happiness
of all (Easterlin, 1974, 1995, 2001; Easterlin et al., 2010)1. I provide evidence of a “Paradox of
1It has been reconsidered by Stevenson and Wolfers (2008, 2013) who show that some of the previous results
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the Joneses", which echoes the Easterlin Paradox in the realm of visible wealth. Namely, since
1980 and despite the large upscaling in size of American homes, average house satisfaction
has remained steady. However, within a given year, living in a bigger house is systematically
associated with higher satisfaction2. The Easterlin paradox can be explained by the presence
of hedonic adaptation and income comparisons in the utility function (Clark et al., 2008;
Loewenstein and Ubel, 2008). The latter is largely influenced by the level of income inequality
and depends on the capacity of individuals to observe others’ income, either through a direct
revelation of information, or through its indirect impact on visible choices (Card et al., 2012;
Winkelmann, 2012). Since housing ranks among the most visible items in both lab experiments
or survey analysis, it can be classified as a typical positional good (Alpizar et al., 2005; Solnick
and Hemenway, 2005; Heffetz, 2011)3. Besides, I document that variations in top housing
size inequality displayed a similar U-shaped curve as the variation in top income inequality
documented by Piketty and Saez (2003)4.
To identify the presence of comparison effects in size at the county level, I use a method-
ology similar to Malmendier and Nagel (2011, 2016), who exploit cross-sectional differences
in macroeconomic histories across birth cohorts. My strategy is based on cross-sectional dif-
ferences in house construction histories of different cohorts of movers, over time and across
suburbs. I exploit experienced variations between existing home owners in the size of newly
built suburban houses since they moved in. Suppose two similar households who lived in the
same suburb and are both surveyed in 1995. The suburb’s variation in top housing size saw
a sharp increase between 1980 and 1990 but no rise since then. The only difference between
household A and household B is that A moved in 1980 while B moved in 1990. Unless they
perfectly internalized future variations in housing size when buying a house, household A, who
experienced a rise in top housing size should be less satisfied than household Bwho experienced
were statistical artifacts. However, the critique largely comes from a misunderstanding regarding the definition
of the Paradox, which results from the contradiction between a positive correlation in cross-sectional data and an
absence of positive longitudinal correlation in the long-run.
2This is robust over the income and size distributions and to the inclusion of household, house and neighborhood
controls.
3The measure of visibility used by Heffetz (2011) corresponds to socio-cultural visibility, not physical visibility
as his survey asks how quickly one would notice another person’s expenditures across commodities. Heffetz (2012)
argues “an expenditure is considered culturally visible as long as it is the case that in the socio-cultural context in
which it is made, society has direct means to correctly assess the amount spent."
4To the notable exception of Albouy and Zabek (2016) who use the gini of home prices and rent to measure
housing inequality, this is the first attempt to relate US patterns of income concentration to visible wealth inequality
over such a long period.
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no change at all. From the American Housing Survey, I know homeowners’ county of residence
and tenure period, which allows me to match each household to representative time series of
the flow of newly built houses obtained via web-scrapping techniques. This method answers
Manski (1993)’s reflexion problem as it focuses on variations in neighborhood characteristics
after the moving choice has been made. It also allows me to introduce county-year fixed effects,
cohort fixed effects and length of tenure to control for any general time trend and suburban
differences between households at the time they are being surveyed. I complement the analysis
with hedonic regression methods. I also run an individual and house fixed effect estimator on
a panel subsample of my dataset to account for any time-invariant unobservables. The hedonic
and panel fixed effects results are consistent with the results obtained via the main specification.
The results confirm the presence of upward comparison effects in visible wealth within
American suburbs, consistent with the literature on difference inequity aversion (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002). The richness of my dataset allows me to test
for different reference groups, as I can exploit variations in size at various parts of the size
distribution. A local increase in size of relatively bigger houses reduces my house satisfaction
and house value, while a local increase of relatively smaller houses is not significant. The
upward comparison effect is driven by the top of the distribution, or “superstar houses", defined
as houses belonging to the top decile of the size distribution. Their size is negatively related to
house satisfaction, contrary to the median size. Social comparisons supports the trickle-down
(or expenditure cascade) hypothesis discussed in Frank et al. (2010) or Bertrand and Morse
(2013). A one percent rise in size at the top of the distribution offsets the utility gains from a
similar rise in own housing size, and lowers the value of the house as assessed by the household.
Competition for size is a zero sum game, as further increases in the size of relatively bigger
houses depreciates the subjective value of my own house. I also find evidence of hedonic
adaptation, though significantly lower than previous results on poor slum dwellers in Latin
America (Galiani et al., 2015).
A legitimate concern is that the effect on house satisfaction simply captures a general impact
of inequality on life satisfaction, rather than a relative size effect. For instance, increases in
average housing size could be associated to higher population density and congestion costs
within counties, which would lower life satisfaction and, in turn, house satisfaction. To address
this concern, I include experienced variation in population density as an additional control,
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which does not alter the significance of my results. I also replicate the analysis using a
subjective neighborhood satisfaction index as the dependent variable. This alternative measure
of life satisfaction is not significantly associated with experienced increase in top housing size. I
also look directly at the effect of within suburb segregation, computed as the distance separating
smaller houses from bigger houses. This spatial concern is critical as the rise in housing size
inequality since the 1980s was associated to a simultaneous rise in segregation between rich and
poor (Bischoff and Reardon, 2014). Experienced suburban segregation is positively associated
to house satisfaction, but lowers neighborhood satisfaction. However, segregation and inequality
are likely endogenous. Hence I also study the effect of variations in top housing size unrelated
to variations in segregation using geographically constructed measures of developable land
computed by Saiz (2010). Inelastic metropolitan areas where land is constrained face similar
increase in size inequality than elastic areas, but almost no variation in housing segregation. As
expected, the relative size effect is concentrated in these areas.
Lastly, I show relatively deprived households keep up with the Joneses. They react to the
relative downscaling of their house by increasing its size, and subscribe to new mortgage loans.
Controlling for individual and house fixed effects, I find that relative deprivation in size affected
households’ choices in terms of future upscaling and borrowings. A 1% rise in top housing size
during the length of tenure is associated to a 0.1% rise in size through home improvements, and a
0.5% rise in the level of outstanding mortgage debt. These estimates indicate that in the absence
of any increase in housing size at the top of the distribution, the amount of mortgage debt
would have been 13.5% lower at the eve of the 2008 financial crisis. Under the same national
income trend, the absence of the keeping up with the Joneses effect would have reduced the
2007 mortgage debt to national income ratio back to where it was in 1990, i.e. from 90% to 65%
of national income. Importantly, if higher housing size ends up having no long-term aggregate
effect on house satisfaction, it may not be the case for the consequence of financial distress on
life satisfaction. Indeed, contrary to housing size, the negative effect of mortgage debt may
prevail in the long-run, and even more so for credit-constrained households unable to rollover
their debt.
The article first contributes to the literature on social preferences and relative income.
Housing satisfaction being a significant component of general life satisfaction (Van Praag et al.,
2003), I provide a likely channel for the understanding of previous findings on the negative
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impact of neighbor’s income and top income shares on life satisfaction (Luttmer, 2004; Dynan
and Ravina, 2007; Brodeur and Flèche, 2012; Burkhauser et al., 2016). It also adds to the
urban economics literature on neighborhood effects and housing externalities. Using a different
methodology, Ioannides and Zabel (2003) also provide evidence of social interaction effects on
home improvements. However, this literature tends to emphasize the contribution of positive
neighborhood externalities (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002; Ioannides and Zabel, 2003; Guerrieri
et al., 2013), while I estimate the effect of a negative housing externality. The latter may
generally act as a second-order effect on house prices, but previous studies confirm house prices
to be weakly correlated to life satisfaction. Despite a doubling in UK property prices, Ratcliffe
et al. (2010) finds a very small positive effect on life satisfaction. Regarding the link between
measures of subjective well-being and individual choices, Benjamin et al. (2012) and Benjamin
et al. (2014) show that subjective life satisfaction measures are good predictors of individual
choices. The behavioral effects of relative deprivation on individual choices has been studied
by Frank and Sunstein (2001), Charles et al. (2009), or Bertrand and Morse (2013) when it
comes to conspicuous consumption. In the later study, the authors also provide evidence that
income inequality led to financial distress. Lastly, regarding the link between income inequality
and household debt, the existing evidence is mixed. Carr and Jayadev (2014) find positive
effects at the state level using PSID data while Coibion et al. (2014) find a negative impact at
the county level, using different datasets. However, neither these studies look at the housing
market specifically, nor do they relate choices to happiness measures, despite evidence that
individuals discontinue activities which reduce well-being (Kahneman et al., 1993; Shiv and
Huber, 2000). The results of this article are also consistent with Mian et al. (2010) and Rajan
(2011), according to whom the rise of financial innovations in the mortgage market may have
been the consequence of increasing social and political pressures due to feelings of relative
deprivation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a simple conceptual
framework to illustrate the effect of experienced variation in relative housing size on house
satisfaction. Section 3 presents the two main datasets along with important stylized facts and
describes the methodology. Section 4 shows the results on upward comparison, and discusses
their behavioral impact on individual choices. Section 5 presents a series of robustness checks.
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Projection bias in relative housing size
The identification strategy developed in the paper is based on cross-sectional experienced
variations in housing size between households who moved in different years within the same
suburbs. The intuition can be illustrated with a model of simple projection bias, as defined
by Loewenstein et al. (2003). Suppose a person decides to buy a suburban house at time τ.
The opportunity cost of buying the house is P, which includes any other goods that could
have been bought had the house not been purchased. The person has just one opportunity to
purchase the house. Assume her valuation of the house depends on its size compared to the
size of other houses in the area. The latter can be considered as a consumption externality.
Typically, a person may experience lower house satisfaction if her house looks comparatively
smaller than neighboring houses, but the externality may also be positive, for instance if bigger
houses are associated with aesthetic amenities. A house is a durable good which can last for
several periods. The satisfaction the person will experience is therefore likely to change. First,
the person may adapt to the house so that her absolute valuation decreases over time5. Second,
the housing stock may look very different after new houses get built. Formally, the satisfaction
uτ corresponding to a house bought in period τ is
uτ ≡

hτ − νHτ at the time τ the house is purchased
γk−τhτ − νHk if the house has been purchased k > τ periods ago
where hτ is the size of the house at time of purchase and Hτ is the size of the housing stock
in the suburb at that time. Coefficient ν characterizes the housing externality, which can be
positive or negative and the term γk−τ captures the rate at which the person adapts to his house,
with γ ∈ [0, 1] a constant. I assume the size of the housing stock follows an autoregressive
process of order one, so that
Hk = φHk−1 +  k
where φ > 0 captures the growth rate of the housing stock between two periods, and  t is
a random, independent and identically distributed term with zero mean and constant variance
5Assuming physical depreciation would have a similar effect, which is why we identify separately the two in
the empirical analysis. Evidence on hedonic adaptation is surveyed by Loewenstein and Ubel (2008).
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σ2 . Define T = τ′ − τ the length of tenure between the purchase date and some later period
τ′. The person does not discount future levels of house satisfaction, which does not affect the
intuition of the model. Her true expected inter-temporal house satisfaction between period τ










k−τhτ − νHk ] − P
]
This formulation assumes the person predicts her future instantaneous utility correctly. She
fully accounts for adaptation and has perfect beliefs regarding how the suburb in which she
decides to live may change. In reality, both are hard to anticipate. In particular, one may
overestimate the long-term satisfaction of moving in an area facing changes in comparison
groups. Typically, as argued by Loewenstein et al. (2003), a person buying a big house in a
wealthy suburb may not fully appreciate the reaction of future movers to her own decision to
move, and the resulting change in the housing stock. A classical example of imperfect beliefs
is projection bias, where a person’s evaluation of the future depends on the state of the world
at the time the decision is made. Theoretically, a person exhibiting simple projection bias will







k=τ [(1 − α)(γk−τhτ − νHk ) + α(hτ − νHτ)] − P
]
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1











α = 1, the person exhibits full projection bias towards her house: she perceives her future
valuation as identical to her present valuation. The cumulative dissatisfaction Dτ′τ measured
in period τ′ of a person who chose a house in period τ, then exactly equals the difference
















α[T − 1−γT1−γ ]hτ if φ = 1
α[T − 1−γT1−γ ]hτ + αν[1−φ
T
1−φ − T ]Hτ otherwise
This expression is a function of two terms. The first term reflects the person’s misperception
of her future adaptation to living in a house of size hτ. Since T > 1−γ
T
1−γ , the person will
systematically overvalue a given house at the time it is bought, leading to investments she may
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regret in the future. In the presence of adaptation, the effect of own housing size hτ on house
satisfaction measured in period τ′ will be a decreasing function of the length of tenure T . This
is in line with evidence on how owners evaluate the current market value of their house6. The
second term captures the cumulative impact of the housing externality due to misperceived
variations in the size of the housing stock after the date of purchase. In the case of a negative
externality, it predicts that a misperceived increase in future housing size should imply a lower
valuation of the house by the household in time τ′. This corresponds to the cost of experienced
relative downscaling. Typically, the person imperfectly accounts for future increase in housing
size at the date of purchase and buys a house that ends up being too small. The second term
disappears in the absence of any change in the housing stock (φ = 1), is positive when the size
of the housing stock is growing over time (φ > 1), but negative in the case of a declining size
of the housing stock (φ < 1).
Now, suppose two households, A and B, interviewed in time τ′ who moved in the same
suburb. A bought his house at time τ1 while B bought his house one year later, at time
τ2 = τ1 + 1. Both houses are comparable in size hAτ1 = h
B
τ2 = h. For T > 1, the difference in






= α(1 − γT−1)h + αν(T − 1)(φ − 1)Hτ
First, household A will be less satisfied than household B simply because of the additional
year of adaptation. This is captured by the first term, and the difference is a decreasing function
of the length of tenure. The second term also shows household A will be less satisfied than
household B in a suburb with growing housing size (φ > 1), but this time the difference is
an increasing function of the length of tenure. This result is due to the interaction between
projection bias and reference-dependent preferences. Because the late mover has a higher
reference point than the early mover, the gap between his perceived and his true inter-temporal
utility is relatively lower. This simple set-up makes it clear that in the presence of projection
bias, one should expect variations in construction histories between households to affect their
subjective well-being, even controlling for the housing stock at the time of survey. It also
shows that without controlling for households’ length of tenure, any cross-sectional estimation
6Goodman and Ittner (1992) find that owners over-estimate its value by 5% on average but Kiel and Zabel
(1999) show that this over-valuation is greater for new owners and declines with the length of tenure.
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of relative size effects may simply capture adaptation to the house, or any other general time
trends7.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Presentation of the databases
The main dataset used for the empirical analysis is the American Housing Survey (AHS), one
of the most comprehensive longitudinal survey about the characteristics and conditions of the
American housing stock. Besides providing extensive information on house and neighborhood
quality, house prices as well as homemortgages, the longitudinal nature of the AHS also permits
the analysis of dynamic changes in housing and occupancy characteristics. An important feature
is the presence of a subjective house satisfaction index, related to the following questions:
• Resident’s satisfaction with the house as a residence. 10 is best on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 is
worst. (1984-1995 surveys)
• Rating of the unit as a place to live. 10 is best on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 is worst. (1996-2009
surveys)
Both refer to an evaluative (or cognitive) measure of satisfaction, as opposed to hedonic
(or affective) measures that do not require the cognitive effort necessary to answer evaluative
questions (Diener et al., 1999; Deaton and Stone, 2013). In 1997, the phrasing of the question
changed, though it continued to ask respondents for a subjective valuation of their house
within a one to ten scale. There is no sign of discontinuity before and after 1995 as for the
way respondents answered the question, but the inclusion of survey-year fixed effects should
account for any phrasing bias. Suburban households are generally satisfied with their house,
as the average house satisfaction index in the sample takes a value of 8.2 out of 10. The
house satisfaction index takes a value of 5 or below in 7% of cases only. For values above 5, the
distribution is the following: 5% of households say 6, 11% say 7, 26% say 8, 16% say 9 and 35%
say 10. A similar question is asked regarding the subjective valuation of one’s neighborhood.
7Note that the model also generates different predictions regarding the sign of the interaction term between
length of tenure and each of the two effects.
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I combine 18 waves of the metropolitan samples of the AHS from 1984 to 2009. These
surveys are conducted annually, but with a different set of metropolitan areas (MSA) each
year. Each MSA comprises an average of five counties. On average, the 154 counties are
surveyed three times with a gap of four years between each survey. I also merge 15 waves
of the national samples for the period 1985-2013 to construct nationally representative figures
on the evolution of size and house satisfaction of American movers. The national surveys are
biannual and continuous data on square footage of houses are only available starting 1984 for
the Metropolitan samples and 1985 for the National samples. I further restrict the analysis to
the suburban area of the counties surveyed. After removing observations with missing values,
this leaves me with a sample of about 134,000 individual observations, corresponding to 88,000
individual houses distributed in 154 counties between 1984 and 2009.
These counties represent about 54% of the total American population, and a much bigger
share of the American suburban population. Importantly, 70% of American households were
homeowners in 2007, compared to 90% for suburban households. Table 14 in appendix
summarizes the main characteristics of suburban households from 1985 to 2009 using the
National samples of the AHS. Compared to the average American household, they are somewhat
richer and less representative of racial minorities. In 2009, the median household income of
new suburban movers was $62,621, which was about 14% higher than the national median at
that time, and the proportion of racial minorities (Blacks and Hispanics) was 14%, compared
to a national average of 19.5%.
The AHS does not allow me to construct representative levels of reference housing size
within suburbs for each households’ tenure period. Besides, a substantial fraction of households
moved in before 1984. I therefore construct my own data from Zillow.com, a leading online real
estate compagny in the US which regroups publicly available information on millions of houses
for sale or rent. Using web scrapping techniques, I gather a sample of more than three millions
suburban houses located in each of the 154 counties present in the AHS longitudinal surveys,
which gives me an average of 20,000 observations per county. Figure 1 in appendix B maps the
location of the three millions web-scrapped houses. I restrict my scrapping program to suburban
houses built between 1920 and 2009, which corresponds to the time frame during which AHS
households moved in their respective houses, and collect information on the location of the
house (latitude and longitude), the year the house was built as well as its size. From this large
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sample of houses, I can construct the evolution and distribution in size of the flow of newly built
houses (and the housing stock) from 1920 to 2009 in the suburban area of each county. One
possible concern regarding Zillow data is attrition bias. Indeed, assuming the biggest houses
built got progressively destroyed. Then there should be an increasing downward bias as we go
back in time. This would alter the distribution of houses in a systematic way. This concern is
addressed in Annexe B. Comparing Zillow to the Census Survey of Construction (SOC), I find
no evidence of attrition.
3.2 The Paradox of the Joneses
From Zillow, I can construct time series for various measures of housing size in each suburban
county between 1920 and 2009. Figure 2 plots the mean, below median and top ten percent
housing size in all counties of my dataset. Over the last 50 years, the median size of newly
built houses doubled in size while the biggest ten percent houses saw an increase of 120%. The
biggest ten percent houses built now average 7000 square feet of living surface (650 square
meters), compared to 3000 square feet (280 square meters) in 1940. Considering that average
household size has decreased by about 20% since 1960, the amount of private space per person
has been increasing at an even higher rate. Variations in the flow of newly built houses similarly
altered the American housing stock, as illustrated by figure 3.
If households value the size of their house, one should expect this general increase in
housing size to be associated with a similar rise in suburban house satisfaction over the period.
The national samples of the American Housing Survey provides a representative sample of
home owners between 1985 and 2013. I first restrict the analysis to new suburban movers in
order to abstract from other dynamical effects that could have played a role, such as house
depreciation or hedonic adaptation. Figure 4a shows the evolution of average house satisfaction
and housing size per capita of newmovers in suburban areas between 1985 and 20138. Suburban
households’ satisfaction towards their house has remained steady over the period, despite an
increase in housing size per person of about 50%. This is robust along the income and housing
size distributions, as shown in figure 13 of appendix B. Figure 14a plots the residuals of house
satisfaction after controlling for house and household objective characteristics except housing
8The size of the house is simply divided by the number of persons in the household to get a measure of housing
size per capita.
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size and gives a similar result9, which is also robust to the inclusion of old movers, adding
the year the household moved in and the current market value of her house as further controls
(figure 14b).
The paradox comes from the fact that a cross-sectional regression of house satisfaction on
housing size systematically produces a positive correlation, as can be seen in figure 4b using
the 2011 AHS survey. Typically, a 1% increase in own housing size leads up to a 0.1% rise in
house satisfaction. Subjective satisfaction flattens out significantly above 1500 square feet per
person, which indicates decreasing marginal returns to housing size, in line with the literature
on income and subjective well-being (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010). But decreasing marginal
returns cannot explain the absence of longitudinal trend for houses with size below 600 square
feet per person. The positive correlation result holds for every cross-sections of old or new
movers between 1985 and 2013, with or without controls, as shown in tables 17, 18 and 19 for
a selected sample of seven waves (appendix B).
The Easterlin Paradox is usually explained by hedonic adaptation or comparison effects,
in particular income inequality. Since the 1980’s, the American economy has experienced a
period of income and wealth inequality at the top of the distribution (Piketty and Saez, 2003;
Saez and Zucman, 2014). If households care about their relative income, an unequal growth
may not lead to higher life satisfaction. Similarly, American suburbs may well have experienced
a similar pattern of rising housing size inequality. Looking at the stock of houses each year, I
propose a simple measure of housing inequality defined as the ratio of the biggest ten percent
houses to the below median houses between 1920 and 200910. Figure 5a relates this measure
of housing inequality to the top 10% income share computed by Piketty and Saez (2003) over
the same period. It shows that the U-shaped pattern of top income inequality almost perfectly
matches the pattern of top housing size inequality over a century.
The period of low income inequality in the US also corresponds to a period of sensible
reduction of inequality in the housing stock, the biggest ten percent houses representing 3.7
times the size of the below median houses in American suburbs, this ratio went down to an
average of 3.2 in 1980. However, since 1980 the reverse trend can be observed, with housing
size inequality rising back towards a value of 3.6 in 2009. Since the 1980s, the rise in average
9Controls include household income, debt to income ratio, education, race, age, household size, number of
cars, the purchase price of the house, distance to work, and the year the house was built.
10Taking the gini coefficient of housing size gives the exact same trends.
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housing size was indeed associated with an increasingly fat-tailed distribution, as can be seen
from the kernel density in figure 5b.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Main specification
Following Manski (1993)’s canonical typology, an endogeneous social effect corresponds to
a situation where my own choice is affected by others’ choices. The identification challenge
then lies in the difficulty to control for contextual exogeneous effects. This is particularly
relevant when a house purchase depends on the observed characteristics of others at the time
a household decides to move. Typically, individuals expecting to earn a higher income, or
more sensitive to social comparisons may endogenously sort into counties with bigger houses.
However, this reflection problem is less of an issue if one looks at the impact of variations in
others’ choices after the individual decision has been made. Hence, following a methodology
similar to Malmendier and Nagel (2011, 2016), I identify social preferences in relative housing
size at the suburban level based on how house satisfaction reacts to cross-sectional differences
between households in terms of their experienced variation in the size of newly built houses,
and of changes in these cross-differences over time.
Assume two households surveyed in 2000. The first moved in 1980 while the second moved
in 1990. From figure 5a, it is clear the former experienced a much higher rise in housing size
inequality compared to the latter, whose initial reference point was already high when he moved
in. Therefore, the former should have lower satisfaction than the latter. Figure 6 illustrates this
approach taking the average house satisfaction between old and recent movers computed from
the 15 waves of the national AHS surveys between 1985 and 2009. For each year, I plot the
difference in the average house satisfaction of both groups of movers against their difference
in experienced housing size inequality taken from figure 5a. As expected, the correlation is
negative and significant. The higher is a household’s experienced change in the relative size of
big houses, the less satisfied he is with his own house.
In the empirical section, the measures of households’ experienced changes in housing size is
computed at the suburban county level, which is the smallest geographical level available in the
AHS. It turns out there is substantial variation in relative housing size both within and between
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counties, as shown in figure 7, which plots the same measure of housing size inequality from
figure 5a in two separate Californian suburbs. Again, consider two home owners interviewed
in 2000. This time, they both moved in 1980, but household A moved to Orange County while
household B moved to Sacramento County. They face different levels of top reference housing
size at the time they are being surveyed, but this difference will be absorbed by county-year
effects. However, household A experienced a strong increase in the size of bigger houses while
household B did not. If both perfectly internalized the impact of past variations in housing size
on their current well-being, there should be no difference in house satisfaction between these
two households. On the opposite, in the presence of projection bias in relative housing size, A
should feel less satisfied about his house than B. This method can be applied to the full sample
of households, running the following regression:




γ1mtTmt + β1qit + β2nit + β3xit + uismt (1)
where Uismt is the house satisfaction of a household i living in suburb s at time t and who
moved in year m, Hismt corresponds to the experienced change in reference housing size of
houses built in suburb s since the household moved in, Sst is a set of about 500 dummies
controlling for suburb x year effects, and Tmt time dummies for the length of tenure (in years).
A negative δ will be indicative of relative deprivation. Unless I control for suburb effects, δ
is likely to be positive as suburbs with bigger houses are likely to be richer. The inclusion
of suburb-year fixed effects also controls for any interpretation based on time-specific trends
within and between counties. Lastly, I include a detailed list of controls for the quality qit of the
unit11, the neighborhood quality nit 12 and household characteristics xit 13.
Experienced cross-sectional differences in reference housing size may be correlated to
11Controls on the structure characteristics are the size of the house in square feet, the purchased price of the
house, its current market value and monthly housing costs (including energy costs, mortgage payments, and real
estate taxes), the year the house was built, whether the unit has a basement, whether the heating equipment is
functional, the presence of holes in the floor or roof, whether the house has an offstreet parking, whether the unit
experienced any water leak in the past twelve months, and whether there has been home improvements since the
house was bought.
12Neighborhood quality is evaluated by the household at time t on a scale from 1 to 10, which also controls for
possible measurement errors in the way households answer subjective questions. However, results are robust to
the inclusion of objective quality measures such as crime or schooling.
13 Households control are the age of the household’s head and its square, his race, sex and level of education,
the log of the household’s annual income, the log of mortgage debt, the number of persons in the household and
the number of cars in the household.
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experienced variations in measures which also affect house satisfaction, such as population
density or economic segregation within counties. The impact of experienced variation in
population density on house satisfaction is theoretically ambiguous. Higher density increases
the price of land for existing home owners, which can lead to higher house satisfaction, but may
also be associated with higher congestion costs, which is likely to reduce it. To address this
concern, I compute county-specific trends in population density between 1920 and 2009 for each
AHS county fromUSCensus population data andNHGIS and control for experienced variations
in population density over the length of tenure. Regarding the impact of economic segregation,
it is specifically discussed in section 4.2, as it may interact with housing size inequality by
reducing comparison effects. Sampling weights and robust standard errors clustered at the
county-year level are included in all specifications14.
3.3.2 Alternative specifications: hedonic pricing and panel fixed effects
The housing market provides information on the selling price (or market value) of homes,
which represents the discounted present value of the total services provided by the house.
These services incorporate the structure services along with the service flows coming from
neighborhood amenities or disamenities. Hence if markets are in equilibrium, the relative
deprivation externality directly estimated from the house satisfaction regression should be fully
internalized in the current market value of the house. I also estimate the relative size externality
from a hedonic regression on the current market value of houses15. The underlying assumptions
distinguishing the hedonic pricing method from the house satisfaction method are discussed
in appendix A. To derive a hedonic cost of relative deprivation, I follow the common log
linear approach of estimating the hedonic house price function (Ioannides and Zabel, 2003;
Zabel, 2004). Assuming that the equilibrium condition (5) holds, I can estimate the relationship
between the current market value of the house, its structure and neighborhood characteristics
qit and nit as defined above, and the housing externality Hist . Equation (2) echoes the house
satisfaction regression except that it does not include household characteristics, which is the
14Clustering accounts for random disturbances correlated within groups of houses due to the longitudinal nature
of the AHS (Moulton, 1990). This is less of an issue here since I recover reference housing size from a different
survey.
15Market values as assessed by the household in the AHS are generally higher in levels from transaction prices,
but have quite similar time-series patterns (DiPasquale and Somerville, 1995; Kiel and Zabel, 1999).
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standard approach in hedonic pricing regressions. Hence the new measure of reference housing
size Hist does not depend on m.
lnWist = α0 + δ ln Hist +
S∑
α1stSst + β1qit + β2nit + uist (2)
Lastly, none of the previous specifications control for household and house specific fixed
effects, which may bias the results if the individual trait vi is linearly related to Hismt . For
instance, happier households may be less sensitive to projection bias at the time they decide
to purchase a house, and so be less likely to experience unpredicted future changes in relative
housing size, which would bias the δ coefficient downward. Similarly, households experiencing
higher increases in reference housing size may also live in houses located in more remote
areas within suburb, which would also bias the δ coefficient downward. A house fixed effect
controls for the exact location of the house. Hence, I re-run the house satisfaction and hedonic
regressions on a smaller sub-sample of houses and households interviewed more than once.
This allows me to run an (unbalanced) fixed effect estimator with panel robust standard errors,
controlling for house and household fixed effects. The FE estimator eliminates vi by demeaning
the variables between survey years using the within transformation:
Uist − U¯is = δ( ln Hist − ln His) + β1(qit − q¯i) + β2(nit − n¯i) + β3(xit − x¯i) + γt + uist − u¯is (3)
lnWist − lnWis = δ( ln Hist − ln His) + β1(qit − q¯i) + β2(nit − n¯i) + γt + uist − u¯is (4)
where each upper-bar variable corresponds to the variable mean. The house panel is
composed of 40,912 individual houses surveyed two to four times, on average avery five years
between 1984 and 2009. The household panel includes 24,494 households surveyed at least
twice. Coefficient δ now captures the relative downscaling effect due to houses built between
two survey years. Since the panel is unbalanced, I include year fixed effects γt in addition to
the length of tenure. I use the same specification to study the effect of relative housing size on
house upscaling and mortgage debt.
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Upward comparison in relative housing size
Three main hypotheses are tested regarding social preferences on relative housing size. They
can be summarized from a simplified model of interdependent preferences, as proposed by
Charness and Rabin (2002). The value of one’s house depends on own housing size hi and
other’s housing size Ho such that
Ui =

(1 − ρ)hi + ρHo if hi < Ho
(1 − σ)hi + σHo if hi > Ho
Clark and D’Ambrosio (2015) recall that attitudes to inequality vary depending on how the
reference group is defined, which is usually based on a likely guess. A first hypothesis is the
trickle-down effect (or “expenditure cascade"), according to which any reference level can be
traced back to the biggest houses built16. Households then only care about houses bigger than
their own, so that σ = 0 and ρ < 0. The second hypothesis is the signaling effect, which posits
households wish to distinguish from the smallest houses built, so that ρ = 0 and σ < 017. A
third hypothesis proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and related to the first one, is called
(difference) inequity aversion so that ρ < 0 < σ. To test these different hypotheses, I construct
four measures of reference housing size since the household moved in: the median housing size,
which captures the general increase in housing size regardless of what happens at the top of the
distribution, the average size of all houses bigger than the household’s own house, the average
size of the biggest ten percent houses (or “superstar houses"), and the average size of all houses
smaller than the household’s own house.
Table 1 below displays the main results of the OLS and ordered logit regressions from
specification (1)18. Own housing size positively affects subjective house satisfaction. The
increase in median housing size is not significant, while the average size of houses bigger
than the household’s own house is negative and significant. However, the latter is driven by
experienced variations at the top of the size distribution: it becomes insignificant once I include
16Bowles and Park (2005); Frank et al. (2010); Bertrand and Morse (2013)
17Ireland (1994); Glazer and Konrad (1996).
18See table 20 in appendix C for the full table.
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the size of the biggest ten percent houses built, which is negative and highly significant. To
check for the presence of downward looking effects, I add the average size of houses smaller
than the household’s own house, which turns out to be positive and weakly significant. This
is in line with difference inequity aversion, but appears to be entirely driven by price effects.
Indeed, once I control for the current market value of the house, only the top ten percent housing
size remains negative and significant. This result is robust to an ordered logit specification.
Overall, the evidence on social preferences support the trickle-down effect as only the size of
the biggest houses built really matter. In the rest of the paper, I therefore use superstar houses
as the measure of reference housing size. The effect of superstar houses is sizable: it largely
offset the positive impact of a similar rise in own housing size. Typically, a doubling of the
top percent housing size leads to a 0.35 fall in house satisfaction, which corresponds to about a
quarter of a standard deviation.
Of course, the coefficient on top 10% housing size is an average effect. It could be highly
heterogeneous depending on how a given house compares to the biggest houses built in the
suburb. I therefore interact my measure of top 10% reference housing size with a dummy
capturing whether the household’s own housing size lies below the median size of newly built
houses or belongs to the top size decile of houses built. I also interact own housing size with
this measure of reference housing size and the length of tenure in years, to further identify
the relative size and habituation effects discussed in section 2. Indeed, one should expect the
interaction coefficient to be negative: the positive correlation between own housing size and
house satisfaction should be lower for households who experienced a higher rise in top ten
percent housing size (relative deprivation effect) and stayed in their house for a longer period of
time (habituation effect). Table 2 shows the decomposition of the upward comparison effect for
the variables of interest using an OLS specification (columns 1-2) and an ordered logit model
(columns 3-4).
Results from columns (1) and (3) confirm the trickle-down effect on relative housing size.
The positive marginal effect of own housing size on house satisfaction is lower when households
experienced a rise in size of other houses at the top of the distribution. Columns (2) and (4)
show the effect remains negative and significant for below median houses, but houses at the
top of the distribution are much more strongly affected by the relative size effect: the negative
externality is twice stronger for houses that belong to the tenth decile of the size distribution.
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This may come from a social interaction effect related to distance, big houses being built on
average closer to other big houses, or from a tendency of richer households to compare more.
One way to distinguish between these two possibilities is to run the fixed effect model described
in equation (3). If the heterogeneity is due to a social interaction effect, it will persist with the
fixed effect estimator. If it is explained by heterogeneous sensitivity in social comparisons, it
will be absorbed by the household fixed effect.
Table 3 shows the main results of the household fixed effect model19. The average impact
of top housing size is smaller but remains negative and highly significant. The heterogeneity
persists, with a stronger comparison effect for households living in bigger houses, which supports
the social interaction channel. In the following section, I explore the contribution of segregation
within suburbs to the upward comparison effect.
4.2 Economic segregation within suburbs
The relative size effect should only be experienced when other’s choices are visible. Arguably,
if the rise was associated with a simultaneous increase in segregation between big and small
houses within counties, the social comparison effectmay be a lower bound estimate. To illustrate
this concern, I compute for each year and within each county the geodetic distance in kilometers
separating the average biggest ten percent houses from below median houses, using latitude and
longitude information from Zillow.com. Figure 8 relates this measure of housing segregation
averaged over all counties to the variation in housing size inequality from figure 5a. It clearly
appears that the two trends are serially correlated since 1960. Any empirical estimation of a
social comparison effect at the county level must therefore account for such a striking fact.
The AHS does not provide the exact location of a house within each county but it is possible
to approximate its location from the information provided by Zillow.com. I predict an AHS
house’s location based on the latitude and longitude of houses in the same size decile built in the
same suburban county during the same year. This method relies on the assumption that houses
of similar size are generally built closer from each other than houses of very different size. This
is generally the case in American suburbs, where houses are built following a block pattern or
grid plan, but it may also capture different neighborhoods within suburban counties. I use the
19See table 21 in appendix C for the full table.
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same specification as in columns (6) and (7) of table 1 and include the experienced variation
in segregation since the household moved in as an additional control. I also run the same
regressions replacing subjective house satisfaction by subjective neighborhood satisfaction as
a dependent variable. Table 4 shows the coefficients on the size of superstar houses and their
distance from the household’s predicted location.
As before, an experienced increase in size of superstar houses reduces house satisfaction.
However, the more distant superstar houses are from a household’s predicted location, the
more satisfied a household is with her house. Interestingly, households favor less segregated
neighborhood, as the coefficient on neighborhood satisfaction is negative, but the size of bigger
houses does not significantly affect neighborhood satisfaction. This table indicates that if
households wish to move into neighborhoods with relatively bigger houses, which are better
valued, they must also build bigger houses to feel as satisfied as households who decide to move
in areas with lower levels of top housing size.
The rise in size of superstar houses and house segregation are likely endogenous (Loury et al.,
1977). To identify the relative size effect separately from endogenous segregation of superstar
houses from other houses, I associate each county to a measure of the share of developable land,
or housing supply elasticity, computed by Saiz (2010). This measure has the advantage of being
exogenous to regulations as it is based on terrain elevation and the presence of water bodies. It is
estimated using geographical information system (GIS) techniques on areas within 50-kilometer
radii from metropolitan central cities, which includes all the suburban areas from which the
AHS households are surveyed. A high scarcity of developable land in a given county should
imply a much smaller variation in economic segregation over time, as superstar houses cannot
be built too far away from smaller houses without overpassing the county limits. The effect of
supply elasticity on housing size is theoretically ambiguous: a smaller area of developable land
can lead to a fall in housing size through higher land prices. But it can also lead to a rise in
average housing size through a change in the composition of households20.
Figure 9 plots the average residual variation in size and segregation of superstar houses
between inelastic and elastic counties, after controlling for county fixed effects. Inelastic and
elastic counties are defined respectively as the bottom-quartile and top-quartile counties of my
20Evidence for this latter effect are discussed in Gyourko et al. (2006) who show that an increasing number of
high-income households nationally lead to the progressive crowding out of lower-income households in inelastic
areas.
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dataset in terms of housing supply elasticity. Differences in housing supply elasticity generates
variations in top housing size unrelated to variations in segregation: if there is no clear difference
between inelastic and elastic counties in terms of residual change in top housing size, inelastic
counties see almost no change in residual segregation. Table 5 tests the prediction that the
coefficient on reference housing size should be stronger in inelastic areas. It runs the same
regression as in table 2 but the experienced variation in top housing size is now interacted with
a dummy for elastic and inelastic counties. Results are in line with predictions. The more
inelastic is the housing supply, the stronger is the deprivation effect. In inelastic suburbs, a
doubling in size of superstar houses reduces house satisfaction by a third of a standard deviation,
which more than offset the effect of a similar rise in own housing size.
4.3 Price expectations and hedonic regression
All previous regressions were controlling for house prices but not for price expectations. If a
negative link exists at the county level between top housing size and the general level of house
prices, the relative deprivation effect may simply be the result of a negative permanent income
shock affecting old and new houses through lower price expectations. It seems reasonable to
assume that the construction of superstar houses is associated with higher levels of housing
prices, especially in inelastic areas (Gyourko et al., 2006; Mian and Sufi, 2009). However,
relatively deprived areas with lower land prices may also lead to a rise in top housing size.
I first check whether representative time series of housing prices at the county level are
positively correlated to variations in size of superstar houses. Zillow.comprovides representative
time series of house prices for all counties in my dataset between 1997 and 2009. I regress
the log of Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI) on the log of the biggest ten percent and median
housing size, controlling for county and year effects. Table 6 confirms the positive relationship.
Controlling for median housing size, a 1% increase in size of superstar houses increases the
level of home prices in the county by 1.2%. The positive effect on house prices is even stronger
in counties with inelastic housing supply, which is where the negative relative size effect is also
the strongest. This reduces the concern that previous findings result from lower housing price
expectations.
Of course, this positive first order effect does not exclude the presence of a negative second-
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order effect on relative housing size. In the presence of upward comparison effects, households
who experienced a stronger increase in top housing size should value their house relatively less
than households who experienced a smaller increase, and this should also be especially true in
inelastic counties. I replace the subjective house satisfaction index from the main specification
by the current market value of the house as the dependent variable. Results are shown on table
721.
Without controlling for county-year effects, the median and top housing size are both
positively related to the current market value of the house, as can be seen in column (1). This
corresponds to the general equilibrium effect seen in table 6. In column (2), I introduce county-
year fixed effects. The coefficient on median housing size remains positive and significant, but
households who experienced an increase in top housing size record lower house values. Column
(3) shows this behavioral effect is also concentrated in inelastic counties, in line with previous
results on subjective house satisfaction.
Findings are robust to a standard hedonic pricing approach, which excludes household
characteristics. I then replaced the experienced variation in reference housing size Hismt by
a measure which does not depend on the year m the household moved in. For each survey
year and within each county, I follow specification (2) and regress the market value of the
house on the size of all houses bigger than the household’s own house, which allows me to add
county-year effects. I can also apply the hedonic pricing regression on a smaller subsample
of houses surveyed more than once, applying the house fixed effect specification described in
equation (4). With the fixed effect estimator, all time-invariant unobservable characteristics of
houses are controlled for, including their exact location within suburbs. Table 8 summarizes
the main results22.
Columns (1) and (2) reports the OLS estimates from specification (2) with and without
controlling for county-year effects. Just like in the previous table, the coefficient on the average
size of bigger houses is positive without county-year fixed effects, but becomes negative when
they are added to the regression. Columns (3) reports coefficients from the house fixed effect
estimator. The coefficient on reference housing size is close to the OLS specification with
county-year fixed effects. Overall, results are robust to these alternative specifications, with
21See table 22 in appendix C for the full table
22See table 23 in appendix C for the full table.
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similar levels of magnitude
4.4 Impact on individual choices
Between 1945 and 2009, mortgage debt went from 20% to 90% of households’ annual income.
This mortgage frenzy, which led to the 2008 financial crisis, followed the same trend as the
variation in size of suburban houses, as shown in figure 10. In this last section, I discuss the
contribution of the relative size effect to this national trend. I first test whether the size of a
household’s house and the value of her mortgage when the house was purchased depend on
top housing size in that same year. Results are estimated controlling for year of purchase fixed
effects, suburban county fixed effects, and the estimated log house price index in the suburb
during the decade in which the house was bought23. Since higher levels of top housing size
at that time may very well be associated to higher future household income and neighborhood
quality, I also control for neighborhood quality and household characteristics24. Table 9 shows
the estimated coefficients on reference housing size for own housing size and the amount of
mortgage debt25.
Both are positive and significant. They remain so even when I control for the house price
index, future neighborhood quality and future household characteristics. However, these results
cannot be interpreted as causal. They do not address the reflection problem, in particular issues
of endogenous sorting of households based on their observed and unobserved characteristics.
The evidence shown before on house satisfaction supports the view that households do not
internalize future variations in housing size at the time they take their home investment decision.
This implies that for high enough changes in the housing stock, they may decide to remodel
their own house and subscribe to additional sources of credit. If households who experienced
a relative downscaling of their house react by keeping up with the Joneses, one should expect a
significant and positive correlation between experienced variation in top housing size after the
23I use the same methodology as Ioannides and Zabel (2003) who estimate the price of housing services from
a log-linear hedonic house price function. Housing markets are defined as suburban counties by decade between
1920 and 2009, which corresponds to about 1200 markets. These markets are indexed by dummy variables. I
control for neighborhood quality and the full list of house characteristics at the time of survey listed in footnote 13.
I recover the county-decade intercepts, which are interpreted as housing price index values. I set the price for the
excluded suburb-year to be 100 and those for the others to be 100 times the antilog of the corresponding coefficient
estimate.
24Household controls include the full list of household characteristics at the time of survey listed in footnote 13.
25See table 24 in appendix C for the full table.
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date of purchase and higher levels of mortgage debt. This is illustrated in figure 11, where I
replace the difference in house satisfaction fromfigure 6 by the difference in home improvements
(measured in square feet) and the difference in the percentage of households who subscribed to
additional mortgage loans after moving in. The correlation is significant and positive in both
cases.
To estimate the effect of upward comparison on housing choices, I therefore look at whether
households choose to increase the size of their house at the cost of higher levels of debt when
they experience a rise in top housing size between two survey years. This allows me to run
the same household fixed effect specification as in equation 3, expect that I replace the house
satisfaction index with the size of the household’s house and outstanding amount of mortgage
debt. For mortgage debt, I use a Poisson fixed effect estimator due to the important number of
zeros. Indeed, most households had already reimbursed their mortgage debt when surveyed.
Results are shown in table 10 below.
A 1% rise in the size of superstar houses leads up to a 0.1% upscaling of suburban houses.
Interestingly, the effect is concentrated in inelastic areas, in line with previous findings on
relative deprivation. The effect is also positive and significant for the level of mortgage debt, as
a 1% rise in top housing size leads to a 0.5% rise in the amount of mortgage debt. These results
supports the view that households experiencing relative deprivation due to the downscaling of
their house react by signing up to additional mortgages in order to upscale the size of their
house. On average, the size of houses within the top decile of the housing stock went from
3700 square feet to 4700 square feet between 1980 and 2007, which corresponds to a 27% rise
(figure 3). These estimates indicate that in the absence of any increase in housing size at the
top of the distribution, the amount of mortgage debt would have been 13.5% lower at the eve
of the 2008 financial crisis. Under the same national income trend, the absence of keeping up
with the Joneses would have reduced the 2007 mortgage debt to national income ratio back to




The upward-looking effect on house satisfaction and house prices may hide amore general effect
on neighborhood quality. For instance, an increase in housing size inequality may be related
to more segregated neighborhood within a suburb. I controlled for such effects by including
neighborhood satisfaction as a control variable. However, the presence of neighborhood effects
can be directly tested using neighborhood satisfaction as a dependent variable. In particular, the
sign of the coefficient on upward reference size will tell whether the effect previously captured
is exclusively due relative deprivation in housing size, or if it expresses a more general feeling
of unhappiness. The results in table 11 confirms that I am capturing a relative size effect. If
anything, only median housing size is significant and positively correlated to neighborhood
satisfaction.
5.2 Relatively smaller or relatively older?
The absence of any effect on neighborhood satisfaction and the fact that the interaction between
top housing size and reference housing size is negative supports the view that I am capturing an
upward comparison effect in size. However, as bigger houses also tend to be newer, variation
in size may correlate with unobserved quality, capturing better design, more efficient heating
technologies, or the mere value of novelty. Controlling for the age of the household’s own
house partly addresses the issue. But variations in top housing size may still capture a relatively
higher proportion of newer houses, which in the presence of a relative novelty effect would
bias the coefficient on reference housing size upward. A more convincing test is to look at the
interaction term between the age of the household’s house and his experienced variation in the
size of newly built houses. If the relative deprivation effect is driven by relative novelty, it will
be more negative on older houses, so the sign of the interaction term will be negative. Table
12 shows the interaction term between top housing size and the age of the house is small and




Combining a large survey of American home owners with historical data on the distribution of
housing size across counties, this article documents that despite a major upscaling in size of
single-family houses in US suburbs, households have not experienced any increase in subjective
housing satisfaction since the 1980s. However, cross-sectional analysis suggests households
living in bigger homes tend to be more satisfied with their house. This puzzle echoes the
Easterlin paradox, which is usually explained by adaptation and rising aspirations due to the
presence of social comparison effects. I test for the presence of comparison effects in the size
of neighboring houses using a methodology which exploits experienced variations in the size
of houses built in the household’s suburb after the purchase decision has been made. The
methodology allows me to control for county-year effects and length of tenure effects. Results
are supportive of a projection bias in reference housing size. Households who experienced
higher increases in top housing size feel less satisfied about their house compared to similar
households who experienced smaller changes. I find that the comparison effect is upward-
looking, as households are not affected by houses smaller than their own. More precisely, social
comparison are driven by the size of superstar houses, defined as houses belonging to the top
decile of the size distribution, which is supportive of the literature on trickle-down consumption.
The utility gains from living in a bigger house are offset by a similar rise in size of houses at
the top of the distribution, and the effect is stronger for households living in bigger homes.
My findings on relative housing size are robust to alternative specifications and explain the
decision to improve the size of one’s house. The variation of top housing size experienced
by the same household between two survey years give results of similar magnitude, even after
controlling for household fixed effects. Using the current market value of the house instead of
subjective house satisfaction, I also show households value their house relatively less if they
experienced higher increase in top housing size. The relative size effect is concentrated in
inelastic areas, which experienced similar levels of housing inequality but almost no change in
housing segregation between big and small houses. Households react to relative deprivation by
increasing the size of their house at the cost of higher levels of mortgage debt. Controlling for
household fixed effects, a 1% rise in size of superstar houses leads to a 0.1% rise in size through
home improvements and a 0.5% rise in the level of outstanding mortgage debt. In other words,
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in the absence of keeping up with the Joneses, the mortgage debt to income ratio would have
been 25 percentage points lower at the eve of the 2008 financial crisis. These results suggest
a behavioral channel between housing inequality and household debt. They argue in favor of
zoning regulations aimed at reducing the gap between small and big houses, and targeted on
excessive upscaling at the top of the distribution. Minimum lot size requirements (MLR) have
been shown to have the opposite effect, as they restrict the construction of smaller houses so
as to prevent poorer households from moving in. On that regard, the extensive use of MLR
in suburban communities may had detrimental side effects for these communities. This article
suggests they may have amplified upward comparison effects and increase financial distress,
with at best no long-term improvement in average house satisfaction.
27
Figure 1: Mapping of suburban houses considered within MSA counties
Note: The figure maps all three millions houses web-scrapped from Zillow.com to their exact location
within counties using latitude and longitude coordinates. All 154 counties considered are located within the
Metropolitan Statistics Areas surveyed in the AHS.























1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Top 10% Mean Bottom 50%
Note: The vertical axis shows the variation in mean, below median and top ten percent size of newly built
houses each year. (Source: author’s own calculation from Zillow.com)
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Top 10% Mean Bottom 50%
Note: The vertical axis shows the variation in mean, below median and top ten percent size of the housing
stock for each year. (Source: author’s own calculation from Zillow.com)
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(b) House satisfaction and housing size, AHS
cross-section 2011
Note: The vertical-left axis of figure 4a indicates the average house satisfaction of new movers, while the
vertical-right axis shows the average size of their house. The two measures are constructed from the national
surveys of the AHS for each year. Each dots on figure 4b corresponds to houses belonging to a given size
percentile within the overall housing size distribution in 2011. The vertical axis indicates the average house
satisfaction of new movers in 2011 for each size percentile. The horizontal axis shows the size corresponding
to each percentile. All averages are weighted using AHS sample weights (Sources: AHS national surveys).
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kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 44.0575
(b) Kernel distribution of housing size over time
Note: The vertical-left axis of figure 5a shows the variation in size inequality of the housing stock, measured
by the ratio of the biggest ten percent houses to the below median houses. The vertical-right axis shows the
variation of the top ten percent income share. Figure 5b plots the kernel density distribution of housing size
by decade since 1960 (Sources: author’s own calculation from Zillow.com; Facundo Alvaredo, Anthony B.
Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman. WID- The World Wealth and Income
Database, http://www.wid.world/, 6/10/2016).
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Figure 6: Difference in house satisfaction of old and recent movers plotted against
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Difference in experienced relative increase in big houses
(old movers - recent movers)
Note: The vertical axis shows the difference in average house satisfaction of old movers (tenure length ≥
10 years) minus recent movers (tenure length < 10 years). The horizontal axis shows the difference in the
experienced change in housing size inequality of old movers during their tenure period minus the experienced
change in housing size inequality of recent movers during their tenure period. The measure of housing size
inequality is taken from figure 5a. The year labelled refer to the respective AHS survey years. Observations
are weighted with AHS sample weights.

























1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Orange County, CA Sacramento County, CA
Note: The vertical axis shows the variation in size inequality of the housing stock, measured by the ratio of
the biggest ten percent houses to the below median houses in each of the two suburbs. (Sources: author’s
own calculation from Zillow.com).
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1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Top 10% to bottom 50% housing size, housing stock
Distance top 10% - bottom 50% (km), housing stock
Note: The vertical-right axis shows the distance in kilometers separating the biggest ten percent houses built
from below median houses within suburban counties, averaged over all suburban counties. The vertical-left
axis shows the variation in size inequality of the housing stock, measured by the ratio of the biggest ten
percent houses to the below median houses. (Sources: author’s own calculation from Zillow.com)
Figure 9: Residual historical variation in top 10% housing size and economic segregation after












































1980 1990 2000 2010
Inelastic MSA Elastic MSA
Note: On the left-hand side panel, the vertical axis shows the residual distance in kilometers separating the
biggest ten percent houses built from below median houses within suburban counties, averaged over inelastic
and elastic counties. On the right-hand side panel, the vertical axis shows the corresponding residual
variation in size of the biggest ten percent houses built. Inelastic and elastic counties are defined respectively
as the bottom-quartile and top-quartile of housing supply elasticity (Sources: Saiz (2010) and author’s own
calculation from Zillow.com)
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1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Mortgage debt to income ratio Mean size
Note: The vertical left axis shows the variation in average mortgage debt to annual income ratio. The vertical
right axis shows the variation in the average size of houses built each year over the same period (Source:
Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) and author’s own calculation from Zillow.com)
Figure 11: Difference in home improvements and extra mortgage subscription rate of old and
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Difference in experienced relative increase in big houses



























































-.1 0 .1 .2
Difference in experienced relative increase in big houses
(old movers - recent movers)
(b) Newly subscribed mortgages
Note: The vertical axes shows the difference in square feet upgrading (figure 11a) and mortgage subscription
rate (figure 11b) of old movers (tenure length ≥ 10 years) minus recent movers (tenure length < 10 years).
The horizontal axes shows the corresponding difference in the experienced change in housing size inequality.
The measure of housing size inequality is taken from figure 5a. The year labelled refer to the respective AHS
survey years. Observations are weighted with AHS sample weights.
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Table 1:
Impact of experienced variations in reference housing size on house satisfaction
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Ordered Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Own housing sizeit 0.299∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.183∗ 0.183∗ 0.159 0.208
(0.0151) (0.0330) (0.0332) (0.0950) (0.0950) (0.0964) (0.132)
Median housing sizeismt 0.0590 0.0766 0.185 0.148 0.148 0.112 0.184
(0.113) (0.112) (0.119) (0.121) (0.119) (0.115) (0.165)
Size of houses bigger than own houseismt - -0.102∗∗ -0.0725 0.0278 0.0278 0.0232 0.177
(0.0439) (0.0453) (0.0708) (0.0708) (0.0706) (0.108)
Top 10% housing sizeismt - - -0.273∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ -0.525∗∗∗
(0.0943) (0.0970) (0.0976) (0.0969) (0.150)
Size of houses smaller than own houseismt - - - 0.153∗ 0.153∗ 0.131 0.108
(0.0886) (0.0885) (0.0899) (0.114)
Population density growthismt - - - - -0.000400 -0.00207 0.00702
(0.00941) (0.00920) (0.0149)
Current market value of the house - - - - - 0.148∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0225)
County × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
House and neighborhood quality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Price controls No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 133980 133980 133980 133980 133980 133980 133980
Adjusted R2 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.297 -
Pseudo R2 - - - - - - 0.124
Notes. Columns (1) to (6) reports the OLS estimation of equation (1), which regresses the subjective house satisfaction index on logged experienced
variations in reference housing size from Zillow. Column (7) reports the estimates from an ordered logit model. In column (1), reference housing
size is the logged average size of houses bigger than i’s own housing size in the suburb since the household moved in. Column (2) adds the log size
of the biggest ten percent houses built in the suburb since the household moved in. Columns (3) and (4) adds, respectively, the logged average size
of houses smaller than i’s own housing size and the median housing size. Column (5) adds the experienced change in population density since the
household moved in and column (6) controls for the logged current market value of the house. All regressions control for suburb-year fixed effects, a
set of dummies for the number of years spent in the house, the size of the house in square feet, the purchase price of the house, monthly housing costs
(including energy costs, mortgage payments, and real estate taxes), the year the house was built, whether the unit has a basement, whether the heating
equipment is functional, the presence of holes in the floor or roof, whether the house has an offstreet parking, whether the unit experienced any water
leak in the past twelve months, whether there has been home improvements since the house was bought, subjective neighborhood quality, the age of
the householdâĂŹs head and its square, his race, sex and level of education, the log of the householdâĂŹs annual income, the log of mortgage debt,
the number of persons in the household and the number of cars in the household. Sampling weights are included in all regressions. Robust standard
errors clustered at the county-year level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2:
OLS and ordered logit regressions of relative deprivation in size and habituation effect
OLS OLS Ordered logit Ordered logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own housing sizeit 1.592∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 2.085∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(0.549) (0.0241) (0.953) (0.0339)
Own housing sizeit × Top 10% housing sizeismt -0.149∗∗ - -0.191∗ -
(0.0646) (0.112)
Own housing sizeit × Time since moving init -0.00447∗∗∗ - -0.00554∗∗∗ -
(0.00110) (0.00173)
Top 10% housing sizeismt 0.870∗ -0.292∗∗∗ 1.028 -0.440∗∗∗
(0.527) (0.0794) (0.904) (0.126)
Top 10% housing sizeismt × Below medianit - 0.0623 - 0.0727
(0.0450) (0.0752)
Top 10% housing sizeismt × Top decileit - -0.273∗∗ - -0.449∗∗
(0.126) (0.182)
Time since moving init 0.0383∗∗∗ 0.00460∗∗∗ 0.0476∗∗∗ 0.00584∗∗∗
(0.00823) (0.000835) (0.0127) (0.00134)
County × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
House and neighborhood quality Yes Yes Yes Yes
Price controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 133980 133980 133980 133980
Adjusted R2 0.296 0.296 - -
Pseudo R2 - - 0.125 0.125
Notes. Columns (1) to (4) reports the OLS and ordered logit estimation of equation (1), which regresses the subjective house satisfaction index
on the logged experienced variation in the average size of the biggest ten percent houses built since the household moved in. Columns (1) and
(3) interact own housing size with the logged average size of the biggest ten percent houses built and the length of tenure. Columns (2) and (4)
interact the logged average size of the biggest ten percent houses built with dummy variables for whether the household’s own house belongs
to below median size houses or to the tenth size decile. All regressions control for the full list of controls listed in table 1 (notes). Sampling
weights are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the county-year level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3:
Individual fixed effect estimator of relative housing size on house satisfaction
Fixed effect estimator Fixed effect estimator
(1) (2)
Home size improvementsit 0.316∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0294)
Top 10% housing sizeist -0.139∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(0.0386) (0.0486)
Top 10% housing sizeist × Below medianit - 0.0166
(0.0685)
Top 10% housing sizeist × Top decileit - -0.413∗∗
(0.186)
Household FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes
House and neighborhood quality Yes Yes
Price controls Yes Yes
Observations 54597 54597
Within R2 0.153 0.153
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) reports coefficients from the household fixed effect estimator described by equation (3), which regresses the
subjective house satisfaction index on the logged average size of the biggest ten percent houses built at the time of survey. Column (2) interacts
the logged average size of the biggest ten percent houses built with dummy variables for whether the household’s own house belongs to below
median size houses or to the top size decile. All regressions control for the full list of controls listed in table 1 (notes). Sampling weights are
included in all regressions. Panel robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4:
House Satisfaction, Neighborhood Satisfaction and Economic Segregation
House satisfaction Neighborhood satisfaction
OLS Ordered Logit OLS Ordered Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top 10% housing sizeismt -0.243∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ 0.154 0.0932
(0.0843) (0.138) (0.105) (0.139)
Distance top 10% - predicted location of own houseismt 0.0272∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ -0.0290∗∗∗ -0.0384∗∗∗
(0.00760) (0.0108) (0.00832) (0.0111)
County × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
House quality Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood quality Yes Yes No No
Price controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 126077 126077 126077 126077
Adjusted R2 0.299 - 0.273 -
Pseudo R2 - 0.125 - 0.119
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) reports the OLS and ordered logit estimation of equation (1), which regresses the subjective house satisfaction
index on logged experienced variations in the average size of the biggest ten percent houses built since the household moved in. In columns (3)
and (4), I replace house satisfaction by neighborhood satisfaction as a dependent variable. All regressions control for the full list of controls
listed in table 1 (notes), including the logged experienced variation in segregation as an additional control, defined as the distance in kilometers
separating the biggest ten percent houses built since the household moved from the predicted location of the household’s house. Sampling
weights are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the county-year level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5:
Experienced variation in top housing size, inelastic and elastic counties
OLS regression Ordered logit model
(1) (2)
Top 10% housing sizeismt -0.155∗ -0.291∗∗
(0.0912) (0.148)
Top 10% housing sizeismt × Inelastic countiess -0.307∗∗ -0.405∗
(0.145) (0.225)
Top 10% housing sizeismt × Elastic countiess 0.0532 0.146
(0.106) (0.169)
County × Year FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes
House and neighborhood quality Yes Yes
Price controls Yes Yes
Observations 133980 133980
Adjusted R2 0.297 -
Pseudo R2 - 0.126
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) reports the OLS and ordered logit estimation of equation (1), which regresses the subjective house satisfaction
index on logged experienced variations in the average size of the biggest ten percent houses built since the household moved in. The measure of
reference housing size is interacted with dummy variables indicating whether the household lives in an elastic or inelastic county. Inelastic and
elastic counties are defined respectively as the bottom-quartile and top-quartile counties in housing supply elasticity. All regressions control
for the full list of controls listed in table 1 (notes). Sampling weights are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the
county-year level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6:
Regression of Reference Housing Size on Zillow Home Value Index (1997-2009)
OLS OLS
(1) (2)
Top 10% housing size 1.184∗∗∗ 1.332∗∗∗
(0.443) (0.424)
Median housing size -1.013∗∗ -0.429
(0.508) (0.452)
Top 10% housing size × Inelastic counties - 1.309∗∗∗
(0.432)
Top 10% housing size × Elastic counties - -1.665∗∗∗
(0.377)
County fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1793 1793
Adjusted R2 0.943 0.950
Notes. The table reports estimates of a regression of the log home value index on the log size of the biggest ten percent and median houses
between counties over the period 1997-2009. Robust standard errors clustered at the county-year level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7:
Impact of experienced variation in top housing size on market value of the house
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Own housing sizeit 0.149∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0102) (0.0102)
Median housing sizeismt 0.245∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.0666) (0.0619)
Top 10% housing sizeismt 0.431∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.0191
(0.0696) (0.0481) (0.0482)
Top 10% housing sizeismt × Inelastic countiess - - -0.472∗∗∗
(0.103)
Top 10% housing sizeismt × Elastic countiess - - 0.0975
(0.0621)
County × Year FE No Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
House and neighborhood quality Yes Yes Yes
Observations 134131 134131 134131
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.607 0.608
Notes. The table reports estimates of specification (1) where the subjective house satisfaction index is replaced by the current market value of
the house as the dependent variable. In column (1) county-year effects are excluded while they are controlled for in column (2). Column (3)
interacts the logged experienced variation in top housing size with dummy variables capturing whether the household lives in an inelastic or
elastic county, defined respectively as the bottom-quartile and top-quartile of housing supply elasticity. Sampling weights are included in all
regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the county-year level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 8:
Hedonic regression of current market value of the house on reference housing size
OLS OLS Fixed effect estimator
(1) (2) (3)
Own housing sizeit -0.0755 0.414∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.0533) (0.0216) (0.0521)
Average size of houses bigger than own houseist 0.454∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.0707) (0.0278) (0.0604)
House and neighborhood quality Yes Yes Yes
County × Year FE No Yes Yes
House FE No No Yes
Observations 134130 134130 94456
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.580 0.186
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) reports OLS estimates from hedonic specification (2) with and without controlling for county-year
effects. Columns (3) reports coefficients from the house fixed effect estimator described by equation (4). Reference housing size
is the average size of houses bigger than own house in the suburb at time of survey. All regressions control for the full list of
controls listed in table 1 to the exception of household characteristics (notes). Sampling weights are included and robust standard
errors clustered at the county-year level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9:
Regression of housing size and mortgage debt on top housing size at time of purchased
Own housing sizeim Amount of mortgage debtim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top 10% housing size at time of purchasesm 0.228∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗ 0.220∗∗
(0.0457) (0.0457) (0.0427) (0.127) (0.120) (0.112)
House price index - -0.0321∗∗ -0.0278∗∗ - 0.747∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0129) (0.0400) (0.0368)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of purchase FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood and household controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 163658 163658 163658 113885 113885 113885
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.094 0.221 0.441 0.446 0.509
Notes. Columns (1) regresses the log of the household’s own housing size on the log size of the biggest ten percent houses in the suburb at the
time of purchase, controlling for county and year of purchase effects. In column (2), I add the log of the housing price index and column (3)
controls for neighborhood satisfaction at the time of survey along with the full list of households characteristics at the time of survey listed in
footnote 13. Columns (4) to (6) reproduces the analysis replacing the household’s own housing size by his amount of mortgage debt at time of
purchase. Sampling weights are included and robust standard errors clustered at the county × year of purchase level are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 10:
Household fixed effect estimator of relative housing size on upscaling and mortgage debt
Home size improvementsit Mortgage debt changeit
FE estimator FE estimator Poisson FE Poisson FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top 10% housing sizeist 0.0574∗ 0.0319 0.491∗∗ 0.521∗∗
(0.0336) (0.0351) (0.204) (0.222)
Top 10% housing sizeist × Inelastic countiess - 0.0892∗∗ - 0.189
(0.0354) (0.221)
Top 10% housing sizeist × Elastic countiess - 0.0492 - -0.212
(0.0353) (0.222)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
House and neighborhood controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 54801 54801 54801 54801
Within R2 0.032 0.032 - -
Notes. The table reports coefficients from the household fixed effect estimator described by equation (3), with a different dependent variable. In
columns (1) and (2) the subjective house satisfaction index is replaced by the log size of the house. In columns (3) and (4), the subjective house
satisfaction index is replaced by the log outstanding amount of mortgage debt. All regressions control for the full list of controls listed in table
1 (notes), expect that the subjective house satisfaction index is now used as a control and the new dependent variables are excluded from the
control list. Sampling weights are included in all regressions. Panel robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11:
Placebo test of relative size effect on neighborhood satisfaction
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Ordered Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Own housing sizeit 0.0917∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.171 0.0652
(0.0164) (0.0421) (0.0419) (0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.133)
Median housing sizeismt 0.375∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗
(0.116) (0.118) (0.126) (0.126) (0.125) (0.128) (0.161)
Average size of bigger housesismt - -0.0659 -0.0815 -0.127 -0.127 -0.134 0.0321
(0.0584) (0.0586) (0.0811) (0.0812) (0.0819) (0.107)
Top 10% housing sizeismt - - 0.143 0.160 0.157 0.140 0.0249
(0.111) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.148)
Average size of smaller housesismt - - - -0.0691 -0.0688 -0.0985 -0.0913
(0.0909) (0.0908) (0.0929) (0.117)
Population density growthismt - - - - -0.00797 -0.00790 -0.0147
(0.0124) (0.0126) (0.0154)
Market value of the house - - - - - 0.153∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0216)
County × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Price controls No No No No No Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
House quality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 133980 133980 133980 133980 133980 133980 133980
Adjusted R2 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.270 -
Adjusted R2 - - - - - - 0.116
Notes. This table reproduces the same regressions as table 1 but replaces the subjective house satisfaction index by the subjective neighborhood
satisfaction as the dependent variable. Sampling weights are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the county-year level are
reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12:
Interaction between age of the house and experience variation in top housing size
House satisfactionismt Market value of the houseismt
OLS OLS
(1) (2)
Top 10% housing sizeismt -0.426∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗
(0.0825) (0.0518)
Age of the houseit -0.0625∗∗∗ -0.0200∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.00575)
Top 10% housing sizeismt × Age of the houseit 0.00643∗∗∗ 0.00214∗∗∗
(0.00173) (0.000682)
County × Year Yes No
Time FE Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes
House and neighborhood quality Yes Yes
Observations 133980 134131
Adjusted R2 0.297 0.607
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) runs the same regressions as, respectively, column (6) of table 1 and column (2) of table 7, but interact experienced
variation in top housing size over the tenure period with the age of the house in years. Sampling weights are included in all regressions. Robust
standard errors clustered at the county-year level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix
A Theory: house satisfaction vs. hedonic pricing
Assume a household with income y has the choice between two similar houses in suburbs s1
and s2 at time τ′. The only difference between the two suburbs is the size of the other houses
at that time H1τ′ > H
2
τ′ (hereafter called H
1 and H2). The household chooses h to maximize
maxU (x, h, H s) such that y = x + ph
with x a composite commodity, h the size of the house, H s the housing size externality
in suburb s and p the housing price per square feet. The marginal utility is positive in own
housing sizeUh > 0 and negative in reference housing sizeUH s < 0. In a perfectly competitive
economy, the housing market internalizes the externality so p and y adjust to variations in H s.
In equilibrium, utility is equalized across the two suburbs so that the household is equally happy
in both places, with no incentive to move. The problem can be rephrased from the indirect
utility function V as
V
(
y(H s), p(H s), H s
)
= k ∀ s (5)
where k is a constant. This market equilibrium condition is the starting point of the hedonic
pricing (HP) approach introduced by Rosen (1974) or Roback (1982). The indirect utility of
housing is an increasing function of income (Vy > 0) and a decreasing function of housing
prices for new movers (Vp < 0)26. The marginal impact of a change in the housing size stock
depends on whether the externality is positive (VH s > 0) or negative (VH s < 0). The implicit
cost of relative downscaling C experienced by an existing home owner can be defined as the
increase in income required to make new movers indifferent net of the variation in the market
value of houses:
C = dy/dH s − h(dp/dH s) with h = −Vp/Vy (Roy’s identity) (6)
26The fact that higher income allows for better house quality logically leads to a positive marginal utility of
income. The estimation of the later is therefore very sensitive to the inclusion of dwelling specific controls for
quality, an issue I address later in the paper.
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Taking the total derivative of equation (5) gives
dV/dH s = Vy (dy/dH s) + Vp(dp/dH s) + VH s = 0 (7)
And combining equation (7) and (6), the implicit hedonic cost of the housing externality
equals
C = dy/dH s − (Vp/Vy) (dp/dH s) = −VH s/Vy > 0 (8)
When the labor and housing markets are in equilibrium, the implicit cost of relative de-
privation exactly equals the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) to avoid feeling relatively
deprived. Therefore, by regressing housing prices and households’ income on the experienced
variation in reference housing size, one can recover the MWTP of relative deprivation.
However, if a direct proxy of house utility is available, the right hand side of equation
(8) can be estimated directly. This method is known as the life satisfaction (LS) approach27.
Typically, it consists in regressing a subjective measure of house satisfaction on income and
the externality, holding house prices and income constant, to recover respectively Vy and VH s .
In the case presented above, it requires that the subjective measure of house satisfaction at
time τ′ be a function of the cumulative instantaneous utility flows over the T periods since
the person moved in28. If the two methods give similar estimates, one can claim the market
perfectly internalizes the externality through higher price differentials between relatively small
and relatively big houses.
There exist various reasons why the market equilibrium condition is unlikely to hold. A
classical issue is the presence of moving costs. This generates a downward bias in the cost of the
relative size externality, as households who would like to move to a relatively bigger house must
also pay an extra moving cost. A similar bias may arise in the presence of loss aversion, which
is typically associated with reference dependent preferences (Genesove and Mayer, 2001). Loss
aversion can be experienced by existing home owners but not by potential buyers. Hence, it is
only experienced on one side of the market, which is the side captured by the LS method.
27For a discussion of the LS approach, see Van Praag and Baarsma (2005); Luechinger and Raschky (2009);
Luechinger (2009); Frey et al. (2009) or Ferreira and Moro (2010).
28Evidence that happiness differs from flow utility is reviewed by Kimball and Willis (2006).
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Formally, if condition (5) does not hold, house satisfaction is not equalized across all
counties, so that dV/dH s < 0. It follows that the new implicit cost of relative deprivation
estimated through the HP approach C˜ is in fact lower than the true MWTP as estimated by the
LS approach:




(dp/dH s) = −VH s/Vy + (dV/dH s)/Vy < −VH s/Vy (9)
The hedonic cost of relative deprivation computed from the wage and price gradients would
therefore give a downward biased estimate of the true cost, as it neglects the residual effect
(dV/dH s)/Vy not capitalized in private markets.
B Data and Stylized Facts
B.1 Measurement errors in reference housing size
One way to test whether Zillow.com does well at measuring variations in historical housing
size is to compare my measures to the US Census Survey of Construction (SOC). The Survey
of Construction (SOC) provides measures for the mean and median size of new single-family
housing units constructed each year since 1971. Figure 12 plots the mean housing size of
newly built houses from Zillow.com and SOC datasets over the period 1971-2009. The trend
correlation between both datasets is very close to one over the forty years period. This is
reassuring as the empirical analysis exploits time trend changes within counties rather than
differences in levels. The figure also shows that on average, Zillow captures bigger houses than
the SOC. There are at least two important reasons why the SOC measure of housing size is
downward bias. First, the SOC estimates regroup both urban and rural single-family houses,
while the Zillow sample is restricted to urban suburbs, where houses are on average bigger.
A better comparison is to restrict the SOC to houses built within MSA (though suburban and
central city houses still cannot be distinguished), which reduces part of the gap29. Second,
the SOC is top-coded for the top 1% biggest houses, which means Zillow does a better job at
measuring the true size of the biggest houses built. If I truncate the Zillow sample to exclude
29The Census Bureau does not compute averages at the MSA level for the period 1971-2009, and access to the
micro data of the SOC is restricted to the 1999-2009 period, which explains the restriction in the time trend.
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year
Zillow sample Zillow sample, top-coded
SOC sample SOC sample - MSA only
Figure 12: Average size of newly built detached family houses 1971-2009, Zillow vs. SOC
The SOC data allows me to compare time series at the level of a census region. To further
check for the presence of an attrition bias affecting the distribution of houses over time, I take the
ratio of mean to median size in each census region for each year t as a first approximation of the
size distribution for both datasets. I then compute the difference between these two measures
and see whether the gap varies over time in a systematic way. The right hand side variable used
to test for attrition is therefore:
Attrition measuret = (
Mean
Median
)Zillow,t − ( MeanMedian )SOC,t
Table 13 regress this measure on the number of years past since houses were built and region
fixed effects. There is no evidence of a change in the size distribution over time between Zillow
and the SOC, which further reduces the attrition concern.
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Attrition measure between Zillow and SOC
Time since the house was built -0.000127
(0.000201)
Census Region 2 FE -0.0446∗∗∗
(0.00625)
Census Region 3 FE -0.0202∗∗∗
(0.00620)






Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 13: Testing for attrition over time, SOC vs. Zillow
B.2 Summary Statistics
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics (AHS National Surveys 1985-2013)
Survey Median Income Mortgage Debt Age Household Size % Bachelor % Graduate % Hispanics % Blacks
Over Income
1985 27200 .48 50.1 2.9 .12 .1 .03 .05
1987 30000 .5 50.3 2.9 .13 .11 .03 .05
1989 33400 .5 50.7 2.9 .13 .11 .04 .05
1991 35000 .55 50.9 2.8 .14 .11 .04 .05
1993 37260 .58 51.3 2.8 .14 .12 .04 .05
1995 40500 .68 51.4 2.8 .16 .09 .05 .06
1997 44720 .63 51.4 2.8 .17 .1 .05 .06
1999 49643 .72 51.5 2.8 .17 .1 .05 .06
2001 52500 .79 51.5 2.8 .18 .11 .06 .06
2003 55000 .86 51.6 2.7 .19 .11 .06 .06
2005 56204 .93 52 2.7 .2 .11 .07 .06
2007 60800 .92 52.5 2.7 .2 .12 .08 .06
2009 62621 .97 53 2.7 .2 .12 .08 .06
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Table 15: Summary Statistics, Full sample (AHS Metropolitan Surveys)
Variable mean Standard deviation
Log median housing sizeismt 7.627647 .1851115
Log average size of bigger housesismt 8.038004 .3145736
Log top 10% housing sizeismt 8.446816 .2621535
Log average size of smaller housesismt 7.266919 .303861
Rating of unit as a place to live 8.667189 1.434905
Population density growthismt 1.705343 1.576548
Distance between top 10% houses and own houseismt 2.166717 .8039021
Log household annual income 10.76154 .8187532
Number of cars 1.6463 .9540478
Log household size .9722775 .505087
Age of householder 50.87281 14.43919
Education of householder 8.457465 2.076443
Latino .0512153 .2204375
Black .0495886 .2170944
Sex of householder 1.276556 .4472967
Time since moving init 13.69344 10.94678
Neighborhood satisfaction 8.426219 1.660603
Age of the house 29.61554 17.51382
Log monthly housing costs 6.507805 .7678765
Upgrade in size .0252452 .1568696
Log outstanding mortgage debt 5.876585 7.395139
Log purchazed price of the house 10.9002 1.053359
Log market value of the house 11.73117 .777935
Log own housing sizeit 7.562535 .4197218
Unit has a basement 2.492981 1.288504
Any inside water leaks in last 12 months .0930162 .2904563
Air conditioner equipment .1798308 .384048
Main heating equipment broke down .0170659 .1295176
Holes in floor .0038972 .0623058
Offstreet parking included .1068014 .3088618
Number of stories in building 1.850098 .7998359
Roof has holes .0035047 .059097
Outside walls missing siding/bricks/etc .0091167 .0950454
Unit has porch/deck/balcony/patio .8933518 .3086667
Observations 126077 126077
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Table 16: Summary Statistics, Panel subsample (AHS Metropolitan Surveys)
Variable mean Standard deviation
Log top 10% housing sizeist 8.261751 .2311648
Rating of unit as a place to live 8.714909 1.435132
Log population densityist 1.191727 1.036505
Log household annual income 10.67469 .7952983
Number of cars 1.705406 .9686448
Log household size .9673369 .4985865
Age of householder 53.58148 13.82335
Education of householder 8.24854 2.17397
Time since moving init 17.00666 10.93062
Neighborhood satisfaction 8.472085 1.663519
Log purchazed price of the house 10.61259 .9813398
Log monthly housing costs 6.329193 .7364044
Log market value of the house 11.65002 .7573711
Upgrade in size .0333824 .1796347
Log outstanding mortgage debt 4.813531 7.541122
Log own housing sizeit 7.563651 .4123525
Unit has a basement 2.376623 1.273938
Any inside water leaks in last 12 months .0898621 .2859867
Air conditioner equipment .2064636 .4047708
Main heating equipment broke down .0148437 .1209284
Holes in floor .0036195 .0600538
Offstreet parking included .1074651 .3097064
Number of stories in building 1.88853 .8105
Roof has holes .0019568 .0441924
Outside walls missing siding/bricks/etc .0076776 .0872858
Unit has porch/deck/balcony/patio .8837429 .3205359
Observations 54596 54596
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B.3 Paradox of the Joneses, robustness checks
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Figure 14: Residuals of house satisfaction after controlling for objective house and household charac-
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1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Own housing size 0.874∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.104) (0.0950) (0.0880) (0.105) (0.120) (0.102)
Observations 1594 1475 1344 1329 965 653 3194
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.044 0.071 0.081 0.055 0.074 0.043
Household and House Controls No No No No No No No
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 17: Selected cross-section correlations between log size and house satisfaction, new movers
1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Own housing size 0.554∗∗∗ 0.212∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.118) (0.110) (0.102) (0.106) (0.153) (0.114)
Observations 1585 1460 1327 1298 930 613 3074
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.119 0.133 0.128 0.089 0.091 0.096
Household and House Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 18: Selected cross-section correlations between log size and residual house satisfaction, new
movers
1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Own housing size 0.343∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0291) (0.0295) (0.0244) (0.0230) (0.0246) (0.0218)
Observations 17378 20383 18659 19442 20516 17115 52946
Adjusted R2 0.124 0.088 0.087 0.068 0.069 0.070 0.069
Household and House Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01




Table 20: Impact of experienced variations in reference housing size on house satisfaction (full table)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Ordered Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Own housing sizeit 0.299∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.183∗ 0.183∗ 0.159 0.208
(0.0151) (0.0330) (0.0332) (0.0950) (0.0950) (0.0964) (0.132)
Median housing sizeismt 0.0590 0.0766 0.185 0.148 0.148 0.112 0.184
(0.113) (0.112) (0.119) (0.121) (0.119) (0.115) (0.165)
Average size of bigger housesismt - -0.102∗∗ -0.0725 0.0278 0.0278 0.0232 0.177
(0.0439) (0.0453) (0.0708) (0.0708) (0.0706) (0.108)
Top 10% housing sizeismt - - -0.273∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ -0.525∗∗∗
(0.0943) (0.0970) (0.0976) (0.0969) (0.150)
Average size of smaller housesismt - - - 0.153∗ 0.153∗ 0.131 0.108
(0.0886) (0.0885) (0.0899) (0.114)
Population density growthismt - - - - -0.000400 -0.00207 0.00702
(0.00941) (0.00920) (0.0149)
Market value of the house - - - - - 0.148∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0225)
Purchazed price of the house - - - - - -0.00383 -0.00977
(0.00992) (0.0151)
Household annual income 0.0280∗∗∗ 0.0276∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗ 0.0105
(0.00745) (0.00748) (0.00749) (0.00749) (0.00749) (0.00739) (0.0108)
Number of cars 0.0117∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0101∗ 0.0122
(0.00545) (0.00546) (0.00547) (0.00547) (0.00545) (0.00549) (0.00819)
Household size -0.0905∗∗∗ -0.0914∗∗∗ -0.0915∗∗∗ -0.0918∗∗∗ -0.0918∗∗∗ -0.0873∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0170)
Age of householder 0.00721∗∗∗ 0.00721∗∗∗ 0.00720∗∗∗ 0.00721∗∗∗ 0.00722∗∗∗ 0.00654∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗
(0.000533) (0.000533) (0.000534) (0.000535) (0.000534) (0.000526) (0.000754)
Education of householder -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0216∗∗∗ -0.0485∗∗∗
(0.00272) (0.00273) (0.00274) (0.00274) (0.00274) (0.00271) (0.00438)
Latino dummy 0.144∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0317)
Black dummy 0.0886∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.0887∗∗∗ 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0361)
Sex of householder 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0734∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0163)
Rating of neighborhood as a place to live 0.382∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
(0.00517) (0.00516) (0.00516) (0.00516) (0.00516) (0.00529) (0.0119)
Age of the house -0.00846∗∗∗ -0.00839∗∗∗ -0.00839∗∗∗ -0.00837∗∗∗ -0.00837∗∗∗ -0.00800∗∗∗ -0.0115∗∗∗
(0.000360) (0.000358) (0.000358) (0.000360) (0.000360) (0.000361) (0.000516)
Monthly housing costs 0.0689∗∗∗ 0.0693∗∗∗ 0.0717∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗ 0.0689∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0192)
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Monthly housing costs 0.0689∗∗∗ 0.0693∗∗∗ 0.0717∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗ 0.0689∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0192)
Upgrade in size 0.188∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0424)
Outstanding mortgage debt -0.00571∗∗∗ -0.00576∗∗∗ -0.00585∗∗∗ -0.00585∗∗∗ -0.00585∗∗∗ -0.00380∗∗∗ -0.00861∗∗∗
(0.000989) (0.000988) (0.000982) (0.000982) (0.000982) (0.000995) (0.00150)
Unit has a basement -0.0193∗∗∗ -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.0191∗∗∗ -0.0191∗∗∗ -0.0193∗∗∗ -0.0293∗∗∗
(0.00649) (0.00648) (0.00648) (0.00648) (0.00647) (0.00642) (0.00929)
Any inside water leaks in last 12 months -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0206)
Air conditioner equipment -0.132∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
(0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0213)
Main heating equipment broke down -0.180∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0397) (0.0540)
Holes in floor -0.911∗∗∗ -0.910∗∗∗ -0.909∗∗∗ -0.909∗∗∗ -0.909∗∗∗ -0.899∗∗∗ -0.972∗∗∗
(0.0987) (0.0985) (0.0985) (0.0981) (0.0981) (0.0970) (0.115)
Offstreet parking included -0.0867∗∗∗ -0.0854∗∗∗ -0.0853∗∗∗ -0.0844∗∗∗ -0.0844∗∗∗ -0.0706∗∗∗ -0.0742∗∗∗
(0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0170) (0.0245)
Number of stories in building 0.0158∗ 0.0150∗ 0.0150∗ 0.0150∗ 0.0150∗ 0.00826 0.0106
(0.00832) (0.00831) (0.00832) (0.00832) (0.00832) (0.00840) (0.0129)
Roof has holes -0.378∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -0.384∗∗∗
(0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0898) (0.115)
Outside walls missing siding/bricks/etc -0.625∗∗∗ -0.624∗∗∗ -0.624∗∗∗ -0.623∗∗∗ -0.623∗∗∗ -0.610∗∗∗ -0.717∗∗∗
(0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0530) (0.0692)
Unit has porch/deck/balcony/patio 0.149∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0172) (0.0244)
County × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 133980 133980 133980 133980 133980 133980 133980
Adjusted R2 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.297
Notes. Columns (1) to (6) reports the OLS estimation of equation (1), which regresses the subjective house satisfaction index on logged experienced variations in
reference housing size from Zillow. Column (7) reports the estimates from an ordered logit model. In column (1), reference housing size is the logged average size of
houses bigger than i’s own housing size in the suburb since the household moved in. Column (2) adds the log size of the biggest ten percent houses built in the suburb
since the household moved in. Columns (3) and (4) adds, respectively, the logged average size of houses smaller than i’s own housing size and the median housing
size. Column (5) adds the experienced change in population density since the household moved in and column (6) controls for the logged current market value of
the house. Sampling weights are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the county-year level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 21: Fixed effect estimator of relative housing size on house satisfaction (full table)
(1) (2)
Home size improvementsit 0.316∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0294)
Top 10% housing sizeist -0.139∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(0.0386) (0.0486)
Top 10% housing sizeist × Below medianit - 0.0166
(0.0685)
Top 10% housing sizeist × Top decileit - -0.413∗∗
(0.186)
Population density_ist -0.0175∗∗ -0.0159∗∗
(0.00694) (0.00699)
Household annual income 0.0133 0.0131
(0.00910) (0.00910)
Number of cars -0.000154 -0.000119
(0.00616) (0.00616)
Household size -0.0896∗∗∗ -0.0912∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0156)
Age of householder 0.00723∗∗∗ 0.00718∗∗∗
(0.000722) (0.000722)
Education of householder -0.0205∗∗∗ -0.0208∗∗∗
(0.00356) (0.00356)
Time since moving init 0.00622∗∗∗ 0.00602∗∗∗
(0.00115) (0.00115)
Rating of neighborhood as a place to live 0.360∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(0.00522) (0.00522)
Purchazed price of the house 0.0681∗∗∗ 0.0674∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0132)
Monthly housing costs 0.0231 0.0221
(0.0159) (0.0159)
Market value of the house 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0123)
Upgrade in size 0.187∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.0268) (0.0268)
Outstanding mortgage debt -0.00298∗∗∗ -0.00297∗∗∗
(0.00115) (0.00115)
Unit has a basement 0.0102 0.0109∗
(0.00632) (0.00632)
Any inside water leaks in last 12 months -0.143∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(0.0182) (0.0182)
Air conditioner equipment -0.143∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0163)
Main heating equipment broke down -0.182∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(0.0471) (0.0471)
Holes in floor -0.557∗∗∗ -0.558∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.129)
52
Offstreet parking included -0.122∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.0227) (0.0227)
Number of stories in building -0.0112 -0.0122
(0.00986) (0.00985)
Roof has holes -0.529∗∗∗ -0.533∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.170)
Outside walls missing siding/bricks/etc -0.437∗∗∗ -0.436∗∗∗
(0.0777) (0.0777)
Unit has porch/deck/balcony/patio 0.114∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0191)
Household FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 54597 54597
Within R2 0.153 0.153
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) reports coefficients from the household fixed effect estimator described by equation (3), which regresses the subjective
house satisfaction index on the logged average size of the biggest ten percent houses built at the time of survey. Column (2) interacts the logged average
size of the biggest ten percent houses built with dummy variables for whether the household’s own house belongs to below median size houses or to
the top size decile. Sampling weights are included in all regressions. Panel robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 22: Impact of experienced variation in top housing size on market value of the house (full table)
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Own housing sizeit 0.149∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0102) (0.0102)
Median housing sizeismt 0.245∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.0666) (0.0619)
Top 10% housing sizeismt 0.431∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.0191
(0.0696) (0.0481) (0.0482)
Top 10% housing sizeismt × Inelastic countiess - - -0.472∗∗∗
(0.103)
Top 10% housing sizeismt × Elastic countiess - - 0.0975
(0.0621)
Population density growthismt 0.0294∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗ 0.0105∗
(0.00743) (0.00609) (0.00568)
Household annual income 0.0859∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0644∗∗∗
(0.00564) (0.00372) (0.00368)
Number of cars 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗
(0.00366) (0.00203) (0.00203)
Household size -0.0296∗∗∗ -0.0222∗∗∗ -0.0225∗∗∗
(0.00541) (0.00424) (0.00423)
Age of householder 0.00641∗∗∗ 0.00398∗∗∗ 0.00400∗∗∗
(0.000303) (0.000202) (0.000201)
Education of householder 0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0171∗∗∗
(0.00159) (0.00109) (0.00107)
Latino 0.0981∗∗∗ -0.0311∗∗∗ -0.0299∗∗∗
(0.0262) (0.0115) (0.0112)
Black -0.147∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0132) (0.0131)
Sex of householder 0.0197∗∗∗ -0.000840 -0.000654
(0.00673) (0.00419) (0.00419)
Rating of neighborhood as a place to live 0.0262∗∗∗ 0.0276∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗∗
(0.00169) (0.00107) (0.00107)
Purchazed price of the house 0.247∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.0139) (0.00922) (0.00934)
Age of the house 0.000799∗∗ -0.00184∗∗∗ -0.00179∗∗∗
(0.000356) (0.000195) (0.000200)
Monthly housing costs 0.366∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.0232) (0.0101) (0.00971)
Upgrade in size 0.0526∗∗∗ 0.0196 0.0196
(0.0188) (0.0134) (0.0134)
Outstanding mortgage debt -0.0156∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗
(0.00132) (0.000588) (0.000584)
Unit has a basement 0.0251∗∗∗ 0.00200 0.00259
(0.00929) (0.00259) (0.00255)
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Any inside water leaks in last 12 months -0.0194∗∗ -0.0153∗∗ -0.0160∗∗∗
(0.00949) (0.00617) (0.00615)
Air conditioner equipment -0.0329∗∗∗ -0.0589∗∗∗ -0.0588∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.00486) (0.00489)
Main heating equipment broke down -0.0142 -0.00289 -0.00481
(0.0171) (0.0137) (0.0137)
Holes in floor -0.0556 -0.0570 -0.0577
(0.0493) (0.0467) (0.0466)
Offstreet parking included -0.0620∗∗∗ -0.0746∗∗∗ -0.0733∗∗∗
(0.0168) (0.00724) (0.00719)
Number of stories in building -0.00642 0.0411∗∗∗ 0.0409∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.00426) (0.00424)
Roof has holes -0.0129 -0.00177 -0.00306
(0.0409) (0.0230) (0.0230)
Outside walls missing siding/bricks/etc -0.0652∗∗ -0.0725∗∗∗ -0.0741∗∗∗
(0.0265) (0.0231) (0.0232)
Unit has porch/deck/balcony/patio 0.0403∗∗∗ 0.0483∗∗∗ 0.0471∗∗∗
(0.00938) (0.00703) (0.00703)
County × Year FE No Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 134131 134131 134131
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.607 0.608
Notes. The table reports estimates of specification (1) where the subjective house satisfaction index is replaced by the current market value
of the house as the dependent variable. In column (1) county-year effects are excluded while they are controlled for in column (2). Column
(3) interacts the logged experienced variation in top housing size with dummy variables capturing whether the household lives in an elastic
or inelastic county. Inelastic and elastic counties are defined respectively as the bottom-quartile and top-quartile of housing supply elasticity.
Sampling weights are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the county-year level are reported in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 23: Hedonic regression of current market value of the house on reference housing size (full table)
OLS OLS Fixed effect estimator
(1) (2) (3)
Own housing sizeit -0.0755 0.414∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.0533) (0.0216) (0.0521)
Average size of houses bigger than own houseist 0.454∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.0707) (0.0278) (0.0604)
Population densityst - - 0.266∗∗∗
(0.0367)
Distance top 10% - predicted location of own housest - - 0.00497
(0.00431)
Rating of neighborhood as a place to live 0.0345∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗ 0.00767∗∗∗
(0.00211) (0.00114) (0.00155)
Monthly housing costs 0.669∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.0302) (0.0116) (0.0119)
Outstanding mortgage debt -0.0319∗∗∗ -0.0167∗∗∗ -0.00652∗∗∗
(0.00184) (0.000697) (0.000650)
Unit has a basement 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.00179 -0.000346
(0.0113) (0.00290) (0.00540)
Any inside water leaks in last 12 months -0.0425∗∗∗ -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0171∗∗
(0.0112) (0.00656) (0.00745)
Air conditioner equipment -0.0919∗∗∗ -0.0804∗∗∗ -0.00910
(0.0145) (0.00527) (0.00802)
Main heating equipment broke down -0.0380∗ -0.0202 0.0165
(0.0196) (0.0142) (0.0138)
Holes in floor -0.0946∗ -0.0715 -0.0175
(0.0495) (0.0464) (0.0398)
Offstreet parking included -0.143∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.0140
(0.0233) (0.00777) (0.0107)
Number of stories in building -0.00167 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.00470) (0.00636)
Roof has holes 0.0609 -0.0121 0.0564
(0.0493) (0.0244) (0.0461)
Outside walls missing siding/bricks/etc -0.135∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.0712∗∗∗
(0.0295) (0.0240) (0.0250)
Unit has porch/deck/balcony/patio 0.0755∗∗∗ 0.0737∗∗∗ 0.0135∗
(0.0110) (0.00711) (0.00800)
Observations 134130 134130 109435
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.580 0.137
County × Year FE No Yes Yes
House and neighborhood quality Yes Yes Yes
House FE No No Yes
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) reports OLS estimates from hedonic specification (2) with and without controlling for county-year
effects. Columns (3) reports coefficients from the house fixed effect estimator described by equation (4). Reference housing size
is the average size of houses bigger than own house in the suburb at time of survey. All regressions control for the full list of
controls listed in table 1 to the exception of household characteristics (notes). Sampling weights are included and robust standard
errors clustered at the county-year level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 24: Regression of housing size and mortgage debt on top housing size at time of purchased (full
table)
Own housing sizeim Amount of mortgage debtim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top 10% housing size at time of purchasesm 0.228∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗ 0.220∗∗
(0.0457) (0.0457) (0.0427) (0.127) (0.120) (0.112)
House price index - -0.0321∗∗ -0.0278∗∗ - 0.747∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0129) (0.0400) (0.0368)
Household annual income - - 0.112∗∗∗ - - 0.230∗∗∗
(0.00232) (0.00549)
Number of cars - - 0.0260∗∗∗ - - 0.00709∗∗
(0.00160) (0.00305)
Household size - - 0.103∗∗∗ - - 0.0275∗∗∗
(0.00356) (0.00575)
Age of householder - - 0.00487∗∗∗ - - -0.00660∗∗∗
(0.000134) (0.000306)
Education of householder - - 0.0338∗∗∗ - - 0.0572∗∗∗
(0.000906) (0.00172)
Latino - - -0.0723∗∗∗ - - -0.0195
(0.00706) (0.0134)
Black - - -0.0151∗ - - -0.0355∗∗
(0.00873) (0.0153)
Sex of householder - - 0.00329 - - -0.00396
(0.00351) (0.00620)
Rating of neighborhood as a place to live - - 0.0301∗∗∗ - - 0.0436∗∗∗
(0.000859) (0.00153)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of purchase FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood and household controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 163658 163658 163658 113885 113885 113885
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.094 0.221 0.441 0.446 0.509
Notes. Columns (1) regresses the log of the household’s own housing size on the log size of the biggest ten percent houses in the suburb at
the time of purchase, controlling for county and year of purchase effects. In column (2), I add the log of the housing price index and column
(3) controls for neighborhood satisfaction at the time of survey along with households characteristics at the time of survey. Columns (4) to (6)
reproduces the analysis replacing the household’s own housing size by his amount of mortgage debt at time of purchase. Sampling weights are
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